Abstract

The thesis of this essay is that Wittgenstein's later work, particularly the Philosophical Investigations [1953], is a form of radical empiricism in the mold of William James. To make this connection clear, James's philosophical psychology is first explicated, and then situated in a larger philosophical theory. Following this, the use of James's text The Principles of Psychology [1890] as it appears in Philosophical Investigations is subjected to close analysis. It is argued that Wittgenstein significantly misreads James on a number of crucial issues, obscuring the relations between the two philosophers' views on the nature of mind and the status of psychology as a science. Once the textual connections between James and Wittgenstein have been made clear, an argument for the convergence of the two positions on various ontological and semantic issues is put forward James's notion of 'pure experience' is likened to Wittgenstein's discussion of 'language games', with grammatical connections in the latter's view replacing the experiential links James thought essential to maintain the felt continuity of one's moment-to-moment awareness