Peirce on Psychological Self-Knowledge

Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 16 (3):212 - 224 (1980)
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Abstract

Discusses the psychological self-knowledge of philosopher G. Lynn Stephens who contends that both the overarching assertion that humans have psychological stress at all and each specific ascription of a psychological state to oneself requires justification by inference. Objectivity of moral and aesthetic values and the analysis of modal discourse; Role of certain qualities of objects in interactions among objects; Irrefragable reasons requirement of each psychological self-ascription

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