Synthese 194 (1):143-162 (2017)

Florian Steinberger
Birkbeck, University of London
In this paper I examine the question of logic’s normative status in the light of Carnap’s Principle of Tolerance. I begin by contrasting Carnap’s conception of the normativity of logic with that of his teacher, Frege. I identify two core features of Frege’s position: first, the normative force of the logical laws is grounded in their descriptive adequacy; second, norms implied by logic are constitutive for thinking as such. While Carnap breaks with Frege’s absolutism about logic and hence with the notion that any system of logic should have a privileged claim to correctness, I argue that there is a sense in which Carnap’s framework-relative conception of logical norms has a constitutive role to play: though they are not constitutive for the conceptual activity for thinking, they do nevertheless set the ground rules that make certain forms of scientific inquiry possible in the first place. I conclude that Carnap’s principle of tolerance is tamer than one might have thought and that, despite remaining differences, Frege’s and Carnap’s conceptions of logic have more in common than one might have thought.
Keywords Rudolf Carnap  Gottlob Frege  Normativity of logic  Rationality  Normativism about the mental
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-015-0880-4
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References found in this work BETA

Logical Foundations of Probability.Rudolf Carnap - 1950 - Chicago, IL, USA: Chicago University of Chicago Press.
Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language.John Rogers Searle - 1969 - Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
Change in View: Principles of Reasoning.Gilbert Harman - 1986 - Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Logic Isn’T Normative.Gillian Russell - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (3-4):371-388.
Logical Pluralism and Normativity.Stewart Shapiro & Teresa Kouri Kissel - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (3-4):389-410.
Why Logical Pluralism?Colin R. Caret - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 20):4947-4968.
The Normativity of Kant's Logical Laws.Jessica Leech - 2017 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 34 (4).

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