Die starke KI-TheseThe strong AI-thesis

Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 22 (2):337-348 (1991)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Summary The controversy about the strong AI-thesis was recently revived by two interrelated contributions stemming from J. R. Searle on the one hand and from P. M. and P. S. Churchland on the other hand. It is shown that the strong AI-thesis cannot be defended in the formulation used by the three authors. It violates some well accepted criterions of scientific argumentation, especially the rejection of essentialistic definitions. Moreover, Searle's ‘proof’ is not conclusive. Though it may be reconstructed in a conclusive manner, the modified proof is trivial. Beyond that, the most interesting aspect is formulated as an axiom that is not justified either. Therefore Searle's criticism of strong AI-thesis fails to be a convincing proof — it can be reduced to an unjustified presupposition

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 74,662

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Strong Boethius' Thesis and Consequential Implication.Claudio Pizzi & Timothy Williamson - 1997 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 26 (5):569-588.
Bad Arguments Against a Good Case (Laudan's Attack on the Strong Programme).Márta Fehér - 1998 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 12 (3):233-238.
Searle Freed of Every Flaw.Victor Rodych - 2003 - Acta Analytica 18 (30-31):161-175.
Wittgenstein and Strong Mathematical Verificationism.Cyrus Panjvani - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (224):406–425.
What is Software?Peter Suber - 1988 - Journal of Speculative Philosophy 2 (2):89-119.
Die Starke KI-These.Stephan Zelewski - 1991 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 22 (2):337 - 348.

Analytics

Added to PP
2010-08-10

Downloads
34 (#341,281)

6 months
3 (#211,550)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references