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Being Wrong: Logics for False Belief
Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 52 (3):245-253 (2011)
Abstract
We introduce an operator to represent the simple notion of being wrong. Read Wp to mean: the agent is wrong about p . Being wrong about p means believing p though p is false. We add this operator to the language of propositional logic and study it. We introduce a canonical model for logics of being wrong, show completeness for the minimal logic of being wrong and various other systems. En route we examine the expressiveness of the language. In conclusion, we discuss an open question regarding K4Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
Reflexive-insensitive modal logics.David R. Gilbert & Giorgio Venturi - 2016 - Review of Symbolic Logic 9 (1):167-180.
Logics of Ignorance and Being Wrong.David Gilbert, Ekaterina Kubyshkina, Mattia Petrolo & Giorgio Venturi - 2022 - Logic Journal of the IGPL 30 (5):870-885.
Strong Noncontingency: On the Modal Logics of an Operator Expressively Weaker Than Necessity.Jie Fan - 2019 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 60 (3):407-435.
Logics of (In)sane and (Un)reliable Beliefs.Jie Fan - 2022 - Logic Journal of the IGPL 30 (1):78-100.
Neighborhood Semantics for Logics of Unknown Truths and False Beliefs.David Gilbert & Giorgio Venturi - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Logic 14 (1).
References found in this work
The Logic of Non-contingency.I. L. Humberstone - 1995 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 36 (2):214-229.
Minimal Non-contingency Logic.Steven T. Kuhn - 1995 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 36 (2):230-234.
Completeness and Definability in the Logic of Noncontingency.Evgeni E. Zolin - 1999 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 40 (4):533-547.
A Note on Logics of Ignorance and Borders.Christopher Steinsvold - 2008 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 49 (4):385-392.
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