Bayesianism and the Value of Diverse Evidence

Philosophy of Science 63 (4):666-674 (1996)
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Abstract

In a recent essay (1995), Andrew Wayne charges that Bayesian attempts to account for the rule that, ceteris paribus, diverse evidence confirms better than narrow evidence are inadequate. I reply to these criticisms and argue that, on the contrary, one of the Bayesian approaches considered by Wayne does an excellent job of explaining why, and under what circumstances, diverse evidence is valuable

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Citations of this work

Variety of Evidence.Jürgen Landes - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (1):183-223.
Variety of evidence and the elimination of hypotheses.Jürgen Landes - 2020 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 10 (2):1-17.

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References found in this work

Probability and Evidence.Paul Horwich - 1982 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 47 (4):687-688.
Bayesianism and diverse evidence.Andrew Wayne - 1995 - Philosophy of Science 62 (1):111-121.
Review. [REVIEW]Barry Gower - 1997 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (1):555-559.

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