Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (1):130-139 (2014)

Irem Kurtsal
Allegheny College
That any filled location of spacetime contains a persisting thing has been defended based on the ‘argument from vagueness.’ It is often assumed that since the epistemicist account of vagueness blocks the argument from vagueness it facilitates a conservative ontology without gerrymandered objects. It doesn't. The epistemic vagueness of ordinary object predicates such as ‘bicycle’ requires that objects that can be described as almost‐but‐not‐quite‐bicycle exist even though they fall outside the predicate's sharp extension. Since the predicates that begin with ‘almost’ are vague as well, epistemicism's ontological backdrop is far from the conservative picture it is thought to enable.
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DOI 10.1111/papq.2014.95.issue-1
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References found in this work BETA

Vagueness.Timothy Williamson - 1994 - London and New York: Routledge.
On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3):388-390.
Four Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time.Theodore Sider - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (3):642-647.
Vagueness and Contradiction.Roy Sorensen - 2001 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Ordinary Objects.Daniel Z. Korman - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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