Oxford University Press (2012)
Authors |
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Abstract |
Helen Steward argues that determinism is incompatible with agency itself--not only the special human variety of agency, but also powers which can be accorded to animal agents. She offers a distinctive, non-dualistic version of libertarianism, rooted in a conception of what biological forms of organisation might make possible in the way of freedom.
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Keywords | Free will and determinism Agent (Philosophy Causation |
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Reprint years | 2014 |
Buy this book | $32.52 new (17% off) $32.57 used (16% off) $38.95 from Amazon Amazon page |
Call number | BJ1461.S695 2012 |
ISBN(s) | 9780199552054 9780198706465 0199552053 0198706464 |
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Citations of this work BETA
Free Will.Timothy O'Connor & Christopher Evan Franklin - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Panpsychism and Causation: A New Argument and a Solution to the Combination Problem.Hedda Hassel Mørch - 2014 - Dissertation, Oslo
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2012-04-15
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