A Metaphysics for Freedom

Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press (2012)
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Abstract

Helen Steward argues that determinism is incompatible with agency itself--not only the special human variety of agency, but also powers which can be accorded to animal agents. She offers a distinctive, non-dualistic version of libertarianism, rooted in a conception of what biological forms of organisation might make possible in the way of freedom.

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Chapters

The Epistemological Argument

This chapter diverts a little from the main line of argument of the book to meet a particular sort of objection to the general idea that agency is inconsistent with determinism, stemming from the worry that determinism might one day be shown to be true by physics. This objection is labelle... see more

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Author's Profile

Helen Steward
University of Leeds

Citations of this work

Free will.Timothy O'Connor & Christopher Evan Franklin - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Naturalism.Davidn D. Papineau - 2007 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Are abilities dispositions?Barbara Vetter - 2019 - Synthese 196 (196):201-220.
Attitudinal control.Conor McHugh - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):2745-2762.

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