Ways a world might be: metaphysical and anti-metaphysical essays

New York: Oxford University Press (2003)
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Abstract

Robert Stalnaker draws together in this volume his seminal work in metaphysics. The central theme is the role of possible worlds in articulating our various metaphysical commitments. The book begins with reflections on the general idea of a possible world, and then uses the framework of possible worlds to formulate and clarify some questions about properties and individuals, reference, thought, and experience. The essays also reflect on the nature of metaphysics, and on the relation between questions about what there is and questions about how we talk and think about what there is. Two of the fourteen essays, plus an extensive introduction that sets the papers in context and draws out the essays' common threads, are published here for the first time

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Robert Stalnaker
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Citations of this work

On characterizing the physical.Jessica Wilson - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (1):61-99.
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The Way Things Were.Ben Caplan & David Sanson - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):24-39.

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