Authors
James Stazicker
King's College London
Abstract
Several essays in this volume exploit the idea that in visual experience, and in other forms of consciousness, something is present to consciousness, or phenomenally present to the experiencing subject. This is a venerable idea. Hume, for example, understood conscious experience in terms of the various items ‘present to the mind’. However, it is not obvious how the idea should be understood and there are grounds for worrying that there is no good way of making it precise. Here I explore a way of making precise the idea that properties of things, such as their shapes and colours, are present to us in visual experience. I argue that this important idea is coherent, well motivated and empirically plausible, provided that we reject two traditional assumptions: that maximally determinate properties, rather than just determinable properties, are visually present; that we can tell through introspection exactly which properties are visually present to us.
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Post-Perceptual Confidence and Supervaluative Matching Profile.Tony Cheng - 2022 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 65 (3):249-277.
Daubert’s Naïve Realist Challenge to Husserl.Matt E. M. Bower - 2019 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 96 (2):211-243.
In Defense of Perceptual Content.Susanna Schellenberg - 2017 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):409-447.

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