Meaning and Description in Non-dualism: A Formalization and Extension

Constructivist Foundations 3 (3):231-248 (2008)
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Abstract

Problem: The article seeks to tackle three problems of Mitterer's non-dualistic philosophy. Firstly, the key term description remains not only rather unclear and rudimentary but also isolated from relevant neighboring terms and theories of other disciplines. Secondly, a logical reconstruction and formal model of non-dualism is still lacking. Thirdly, there are hardly any extensions of philosophical non-dualism to non-philosophical disciplines and fields. Findings: The three main findings of the article are based on the abovementioned problems. Firstly, the non-dualistic term description will be connected to the sociological and semiotic term meaning by emphasizing their semantic-pragmatic similarities. Moreover, a common and distinction-theoretic conceptualization of both terms will be proposed. Secondly, a non-dualistic formalization and logical reconstruction will be elaborated by deducing non-dualism from dualism using the operation of re-entry. Thirdly, the non-dualistic formalization will be applied to the classical semiotic triangle, resulting in the elaboration of a non-dualistic semiotic triangle. Benefits: The aforementioned findings have two possible benefits. Firstly, the compatibility between the terms description and meaning makes philosophical non-dualism connectable to social science approaches, especially to sociology and semiotics. This may be an important avenue for interdisciplinary cross-fertilization and co-operation. Secondly, the formalization and logical deduction may help to clarify and explicitize non-dualism's main arguments and implicit assumptions

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