Law and Oppression: A Moral Call to Abstain from the Use of Moral Language

Abstract

: In this presentation, I first establish that morality is invoked to justify the existence of discriminatory or otherwise oppressive laws that harm marginalized groups. Examples that demonstrate this point will be pulled from past and present laws that target homosexual and transgender populations, ranging from anti-sodomy laws to trans bathroom bills. Next, I argue that moral language is imbued with normative and motivational force because of its association with legitimate moral judgments. Since normative judgments provide reason to act, the invocation of such judgments is seen to carry that same reason and motivational force. In the absence of legitimate uses of moral terms, or at least the refusal by a significant portion of the population to use moral rhetoric, use of such terms no longer carries the same force. Therefore, I conclude that there is a compelling moral reason to stop using moral language when discussing laws. Finally, I respond to the objection that this prevents moral discussion and criticism or support of laws on moral grounds. I explain why genuine, content-laden positions still have the same strength and normative force. Such positions can still be discussed in terms of their underlying principles, rather than simply stating that a given law is moral, immoral, good, or bad. However, positions relying upon empty moral rhetoric do not have the same ability and are revealed as lacking true moral justification. Keywords: morality, law, oppression, discrimination, language, ethics, normative, discourse, semantics.

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The Conscience of Huckleberry Finn.Jonathan Bennett - 1974 - Philosophy 49 (188):123-134.
The normative function of metaethics.Paul W. Taylor - 1958 - Philosophical Review 67 (1):16-32.

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