Knowledge, behavior, and rationality: rationalizability in epistemic games

Archive for Mathematical Logic 60 (5):599-623 (2021)
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Abstract

In strategic situations, agents base actions on knowledge and beliefs. This includes knowledge about others’ strategies and preferences over strategy profiles, but also about other external factors. Bernheim and Pearce in 1984 independently defined the game theoretic solution concept of rationalizability, which is built on the premise that rational agents will only take actions that are the best response to some situation that they consider possible. This accounts for other agents’ rationality as well, limiting the strategies to which a particular agent must respond, enabling further elimination until the strategies stabilize. We seek to generalize rationalizability to account not only for actions, but knowledge of the world as well. This will enable us to examine the interplay between action based and knowledge based rationality. We give an account of what it means for an action to be rational relative to a particular state of affairs, and in turn relative to a state of knowledge. We present a class of games, Epistemic Messaging Games, with a communication stage that clarifies the epistemic state among the players prior to the players’ actions. We use a history based model, which frames individual knowledge in terms of local projections of a global history. With this framework, we give an account of rationalizability for subclasses of EMG.

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