Fallibilism and concessive knowledge attributions

Analysis 65 (2):126-131 (2005)
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Abstract

Lewis concludes that fallibilism is uncomfortable, though preferable to scepticism. However, he believes that contextualism about knowledge allows us to ‘dodge the choice’ between fallibilism and scepticism. For the contextualist semantics for ‘know’ can explain the oddity of fallibilism, without landing us into scepticism.

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10.1093/analys/65.2.126

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Jason Stanley
Yale University

Citations of this work

Credence: A Belief-First Approach.Andrew Moon & Elizabeth Jackson - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (5):652–669.
Knowledge and certainty.Jason Stanley - 2008 - Philosophical Issues 18 (1):35-57.
Credal pragmatism.Jie Gao - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (6):1595-1617.

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References found in this work

Knowledge and lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Elusive knowledge.David K. Lewis - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.
Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):353-356.
Assertion, knowledge, and context.Keith DeRose - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (2):167-203.
Epistemic possibilities.Keith DeRose - 1991 - Philosophical Review 100 (4):581-605.

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