Emotion, Moral Perception, and Character

Dissertation, The University of Wisconsin - Madison (2001)
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Abstract

This dissertation challenges the common belief that the value of emotions, if any, lies chiefly in their ability to motivate. It argues that emotions are vital to being able to properly evaluate what one encounters in the world. The dissertation focuses on moral evaluation, examining the role of emotion in determining moral character by way of the effect of emotion on moral perception. The term "moral perception" refers to an evaluative apprehension or "taking in" of a situation, where this apprehension includes a morally relevant aspect. Moral perceptions are a determinant of moral character, and are often the foundation of other determinants of moral character, namely moral beliefs and dispositions to act. ;The dissertation argues that emotions are related to moral character because, by directing and focusing our attention, they affect the makeup and experiential significance of these moral perceptions. This in turn affects the other determinants of moral character---namely moral beliefs and dispositions to act. The conclusion of this investigation is that having the right emotions is essential to good moral character because of the effects of emotion on moral perception. Devaluing emotion is misdirected because emotions are needed for a full understanding of what is significant, morally or otherwise, and because emotions accordingly have vital positive effects as well as potential negative effects. Emotions are an integral part of human functioning and flourishing, and we need the right ones at the right times to function well

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Charles Starkey
Clemson University

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