Epistemic duties and failure to understand one’s evidence

Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 16 (1):147-177 (2012)
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Abstract

The paper defends the thesis that our epistemic duty is the duty to proportion our beliefs to the evidence we possess. An inclusive view of evidence possessed is put forward on the grounds that it makes sense of our intuitions about when it is right to say that a person ought to believe some proposition P. A second thesis is that we have no epistemic duty to adopt any particular doxastic attitudes. The apparent tension between the two theses is resolved by applying the concept of duty to belief indirectly.

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Scott Stapleford
St. Thomas University

Citations of this work

Epistemic Duty and Implicit Bias.Lindsay Rettler & Bradley Rettler - 2020 - In Kevin McCain & Scott Stapleford (eds.), Epistemic Duties: New Arguments, New Angles. Routledge. pp. 125-145.
Against Contextualism: Belief, Evidence, & the Bank Cases.Logan Paul Gage - 2013 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 17 (1):57-70.

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