Completing Epistemic Oughts

Philosophical Forum 45 (2):133-148 (2014)
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Our intuitions about what a person epistemically ought or ought not believe are sometimes quite clear. Keith DeRose and Richard Feldman have devised examples about which our intuitions are likely to conflict. DeRose argues that the conflict of intuitions arises from ambiguity in the epistemic ought. I argue that it results from incompleteness. The success of the argument depends on rejecting the narrow conception of evidential support according to which a person’s evidence supports some proposition P only if the person apprehends the connection between her evidence and P. I argue that this view is mistaken.



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Scott Stapleford
St. Thomas University

Citations of this work

Evidentialism and Epistemic Duties to Inquire.Emily C. McWilliams - 2023 - Philosophical Quarterly 73 (4):965-982.
Intraspecies impermissivism.Scott Stapleford - 2018 - Episteme 16 (3):340-356.

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References found in this work

The Ethics of Belief.Richard Feldman - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):667-695.
Recent Work on the Basing Relation.Keith Allen Korez - 1997 - American Philosophical Quarterly 34 (2):171 - 191.
Authoritarian Epistemology.Richard Feldman - 1995 - Philosophical Topics 23 (1):147-169.

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