Anthony brueckner/contents just aren't in the head 1–6 Byeong D. lee/douven on Putnam's model-theoretic argument 7–12 Giorgio volpe/ideal epistemic situations and the access-ibility of realist truth 13–31 [Book Review]

Erkenntnis 58 (1):417-418 (2003)
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