Abstract

In his foundational enactivist writings, Francisco Varela explained the self as 'virtual', 'fictional', and 'groundless'. More recent enactivist scholars have taken issue with Varela's analysis, elevating the self to the same ontological status as other biological processes. On their interpretation, our 'self' can be considered an autonomous system in the same manner as cells, organs, and organisms. After discussing the enactivist's definition of an autonomous system, this paper examines the lack of clarity from more recent scholars around precisely how our self can fulfil this definition. Specifically, the challenge of meeting the enactivist's criteria will be illustrated through a discussion of a narrative self, a socially co-generated self, and approaches to the self that eschew metaphysical commitments. Through this examination, we see some of the challenges faced in arguing that the self exists in the same way as our cells and organs, and why Varela chooses instead to focus on the virtual self. To close, the paper examines how an approach that aligns with Varela's foundational writings can handle the questions of reductionism and social interaction.