Abstract

Surprisingly few moral theorists have focused deliberate attention on the activity of moral criticism, perhaps presuming that a moral criticism is as justified as any “verdict” expressed in it. I argue first that there are deep difficulties with establishing “summary” verdicts upon an action, and that even if we have an adequate theory with which to reach judgment on one another’s actions, it is unclear how such verdicts are relevant to specific situated critics in practice. Both Kantian and consequentialist theories face a difficulty in appreciating critical practice as simultaneously backward-looking and forward-looking. I argue second that the adequacy of Strawson-type “reactive attitudes” is dubious in precisely those cases where moral community is fragile. In particular, an attitude of “critical resistance” on the part of those against whom we react is part and parcel of normal moral agency in a wide range of circumstances. Agents with vices that do not respond well to “reactive attitudes” cannot be considered “abnormal” and ought not to be treated simply with an “objective attitude”. I propose an alternate, “dialectical” attitude, and defend its role within a virtue of critical competence.