Reversing 30 years of discussion: why causal decision theorists should one-box

Synthese 187 (1):95-122 (2012)
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Abstract

The paper will show how one may rationalize one-boxing in Newcomb's problem and drinking the toxin in the Toxin puzzle within the confines of causal decision theory by ascending to so-called reflexive decision models which reflect how actions are caused by decision situations (beliefs, desires, and intentions) represented by ordinary unreflexive decision models

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Wolfgang Spohn
Universität Konstanz

Citations of this work

Why Take Both Boxes?Jack Spencer & Ian Wells - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (1):27-48.
Conditionals and the Hierarchy of Causal Queries.Niels Skovgaard-Olsen, Simon Stephan & Michael R. Waldmann - 2021 - Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 1 (12):2472-2505.
Causal decision theory.Paul Weirich - 2009 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Decision and Intervention.Reuben Stern - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (4):783-804.

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