How are Mathematical Objects Constituted? A Structuralist Answer

Abstract

The paper proposes to amend structuralism in mathematics by saying what places in a structure and thus mathematical objects are. They are the objects of the canonical system realizing a categorical structure, where that canonical system is a minimal system in a specific essentialistic sense. It would thus be a basic ontological axiom that such a canonical system always exists. This way of conceiving mathematical objects is underscored by a defense of an essentialistic version of Leibniz’ principle according to which each object is uniquely characterized by its proper and possibly relational essence (where “proper” means “not referring to identity").

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Wolfgang Spohn
Universität Konstanz

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References found in this work

On the Plurality of Worlds.David K. Lewis - 1986 - Malden, Mass.: Wiley-Blackwell.
Essence and modality.Kit Fine - 1994 - Philosophical Perspectives 8 (Logic and Language):1-16.
On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3):388-390.
What numbers could not be.Paul Benacerraf - 1965 - Philosophical Review 74 (1):47-73.
Mathematics as a science of patterns.Michael David Resnik - 1997 - New York ;: Oxford University Press.

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