Elizabeth Anscombe on Rationalism
Abstract
Elizabeth Anscombe’s “Modern Moral Philosophy” is rightly famous. In it, she argues
explicitly for several theses and implicitly for several more; studying the essay, one gets the
impression that these theses are related to one another by implication—but it’s not obvious
precisely how they are related. In this chapter, I suggest—less controversially, perhaps—that at
the heart of “Modern Moral Philosophy” is Anscombe’s rejection of what she calls
“consequentialism.” I also suggest—more controversially, perhaps—that Anscombe is
articulating a tension within consequentialism: the form of consequentialism presupposes the
existence of a divine legislator, while the content of consequentialism presupposes the
nonexistence of a divine legislator. In making this argument, I employ the work of David
Solomon, a senior scholar of the work of Elizabeth Anscombe.