The logic of tests of significance

Philosophy of Science 41 (3):211-226 (1974)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In spite of the fact that the Neyman-Pearson theory of testing is the official theory of statistical testing, most research publications in the social sciences use a pattern of inductive reasoning that is characteristic of Fisherian tests of significance. The exact structure and rationale of this pattern of reasoning is widely misunderstood. The goal of the paper is to describe precisely the pattern and its rationale, and to show that while it is far more cogent than Fisher's critics have realized, it does not logically sustain the inferences it sanctions

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 89,621

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
251 (#71,181)

6 months
2 (#646,201)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Stephen Spielman
University of Pennsylvania (PhD)

Citations of this work

Resolving Neyman's paradox.Max Albert - 2002 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (1):69-76.

View all 9 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

A falsifying rule for probability statements.Donald A. Gillies - 1971 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 22 (3):231-261.
A refutation of the Neyman-Pearson theory of testing.Stephen Spielman - 1973 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 24 (3):201-222.

Add more references