Abstract

This paper examines the drive for consensus from the perspective of the good government framework for federal advisory commissions in the United States. Specifically, the paper examines the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) – the statute, its regulations, and case law. It shows that the FACA was intended to be an antidote to abuses in consensus‐making processes, including the failure to fully include competing views on commissions. The index of suspicion in the FACA scheme rises when a group work product – including a consensus report – is to be the basis of recommendations to federal officials. Once FACA's requirements regarding committee composition are satisfied, the index of suspicion drops and FACA is indifferent to consensus‐making; but the conditions for informed, meaningful participation apply to members who dissent from, as well as those who participate in, consensus. In negotiated rulemaking, the push for consensus and closure creates unacceptable tension with the good government goals of openness and accountability. Proponents of consensus‐only bioethics commissions can learn from FACA‐related legislative, agency, and judicial insights that consensus‐seeking is not always desired by government officials; is rarely cost free; and that diversity and dissent enhance openness, accountability, and fairness. The burden of proof is therefore on proponents of a consensus‐only standard for bioethics commissions to demonstrate that a drive for consensus furthers sound decision‐making by government officials more than it sets back openness and accountability to a diverse public.