Do valor da vida, dos interesses, do sujeito

Ethic@ - An International Journal for Moral Philosophy 3 (3):223-237 (2004)
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Abstract

O presente artigo versa sobre um dos mais polêmicos temas da ética prática, a saber, a inclusão de seres não-humanos na esfera da moral. Busca-se aqui reconstruir os argumentosde Peter Singer e Holmes Rolston III sobre o valor da vida, dos interesses e do sujeito. Ambos os autores defendem um alargamento da esfera moral, tradicionalmente reduzidasomente aos seres da espécie humana. Suas teorias, porém, entram em conflito quando se trata dos limites da esfera moral. Enquanto Singer defende que a dor e o sofrimento, portantoos interesses, sejam o critério que a delimita, Rolston defende que a vida como um todo deve ser levada em conta na ética. Quando se trata da questão de valores, os dois autoresdistanciam-se ainda mais. Enquanto Singer nos diz que apenas a vida das pessoas, seres que sentem dor e prazer, além de desejarem a vida e planejá-la, é portadora de valor em si,Rolston defende que todos os seres vivos, bem como os ecossistemas e o planeta como um todo são portadores de valor em si.O presente artigo reconstitui este debate, buscandoresponder à questão de qual deve ser a linha delimitatória da esfera moral.This article deals with one of the most controversial topics in practical ethics, namely theinclusion of nonhuman beings into the domain of morality. It seeks to reconstruct PeterSinger’s and Holmes Rolston III’s arguments on the value of life and the interests of a moralsubject. Both authors hold a widening in the sphere of morality, traditionally reduced tohuman beings. Their position, however, conflicts with the limits of the moral sphere. WhileSinger holds that pain and suffering or interests will be the criteria to establish the limits ofsuch domain, Rolston defends that life as a whole should be take into account in ethics.Moreover, while Singer says that only the life of persons, i.e. beings who feel pain andpleasure and who desire and plan their life, is valuable in itself, Rolston maintains that allliving beings, even ecosystems and the planet as a whole, have value in itself. This articlereconstructs this debate, searching to answer the following question: which are the limits ofthe moral sphere?

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