Representational entities and representational acts

In Jeffrey C. King, Scott Soames & Jeff Speaks (eds.), New Thinking About Propositions (2014)
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Abstract

This chapter is devoted to criticisms of the views of propositions defended by my co-authors, Jeff King and Scott Soames. The focus is on criticism of their attempts to explain the representational properties of propositions. The criticisms are varied, but one theme is a tension between their view that our actions can explain the representational properties of propositions and their commitment to the idea that propositions have their representational properties essentially.

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Author's Profile

Jeff Speaks
University of Notre Dame

Citations of this work

Propositions.Matthew McGrath - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Propositions as Structured Cognitive Event‐Types.Wayne A. Davis - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (3):665-692.
Not the optimistic type.Ben Caplan, Chris Tillman, Brian McLean & Adam Murray - 2013 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (5):575-589.
Unity through truth.Bryan Pickel - 2019 - Synthese 196 (4):1425-1452.
Benacerraf’s revenge.Ben Caplan & Chris Tillman - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (S1):111-129.

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References found in this work

Essence and modality.Kit Fine - 1994 - Philosophical Perspectives 8 (Logic and Language):1-16.
What is Meaning?Scott Soames - 2010 - Princeton University Press.

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