On the relation between counterfactual and causal reasoning

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5-6):466-467 (2007)
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We critique the distinction Byrne makes between strong causes and enabling conditions, and its implications, on both theoretical and empirical grounds. First, we believe that the difference is psychological, not logical. Second, we disagree that there is a strict Third, we disagree that it is easier for people to generate causes than counterfactuals



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Norms in Counterfactual Selection.Sina Fazelpour - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (1):114-139.

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