Intuitive and Reflective Beliefs

Mind and Language 12 (1):67-83 (1997)
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Abstract

Humans have two kinds of beliefs, intuitive beliefs and reflective beliefs. Intuitive beliefs are a fundamental category of cognition, defined in the architecture of the mind. They are formulated in an intuitive mental lexicon. Humans are also capable of entertaining an indefinite variety of higher‐order or‘reflective’propositional attitudes, many of which are of a credat sort. Reasons to hold reflective beliefs are provided by other beliefs that describe the source of the reflective belief as reliable, or that provide an explicit argument in favour of the reflective belief. The mental lexicon of reflective beliefs includes not only intuitive, but also reflective concepts.

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Dan Sperber
Institut Jean Nicod

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References found in this work

Rethinking Symbolism.Dan Sperber & Alice L. Morton - 1977 - Philosophy and Rhetoric 10 (4):281-282.
Apparently irrational beliefs.Dan Sperber - 1982 - In Martin Hollis & Steven Lukes (eds.), Rationality and Relativism. MIT Press. pp. 149--180.

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