Experiential Pluralism and Mental Kinds

In Heather Logue & Louise Richardson (eds.), Purpose and Procedure in Philosophy of Perception (forthcoming)
  Copy   BIBTEX


This paper offers a new argument in favour of experiential pluralism about visual experience – the view that the nature of successful visual experience is different from the nature of unsuccessful visual experience. The argument appeals to the role of experience in explaining possession of ordinary abilities. In addition, the paper makes a methodological point about philosophical debates concerning the nature of perceptual experience: whether a given view about the nature of experience amounts to an interesting and substantive thesis about our own minds depends on the significance of the psychological or mental kind claim made by it. This means that an adequate defence of a given view of the nature of experience must include articulation of the latter's significance qua psychological or mental kind. The argument advanced provides the material to meet this demand. In turn, this constitutes further support for the argument itself.



External links

  • This entry has no external links. Add one.
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Do We Perceive Natural Kind Properties?Berit Brogaard - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (1):35 - 42.
Attention to mental paint and change detection.Assaf Weksler - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (8):1991-2007.
Mental Reality.Galen Strawson - 1994 - Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Mental Reality. [REVIEW]Irene Switankowsky - 1998 - Dialogue 37 (2):409-410.
What makes representational painting truly visual?Richard Wollheim - 2003 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 77 (1):131–147.
Being Red and Seeing Red: Sensory and Perceptible Qualities.Peter W. Ross - 1997 - Dissertation, City University of New York
Visual stuff and active vision.Wayne Wright - 2006 - Philosophical Psychology 19 (2):129-149.
Pictures, presence and visibility.Solveig Aasen - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (1):187-203.


Added to PP

378 (#53,879)

6 months
91 (#52,188)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Maja Spener
University of Birmingham

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Reference and Consciousness.John Campbell - 2002 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
The transparency of experience.Michael G. F. Martin - 2002 - Mind and Language 17 (4):376-425.
On Clear and Confused Ideas: An Essay About Substance Concepts.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 2000 - Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
An Essay on Free Will.Peter van Inwagen - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.
What 'must' and 'can' must and can mean.Angelika Kratzer - 1977 - Linguistics and Philosophy 1 (3):337--355.

View all 35 references / Add more references