Consciousness, introspection, and subjective measures

In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press (2020)
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Abstract

This chapter discusses the main types of so-called ’subjective measures of consciousness’ used in current-day science of consciousness. After explaining the key worry about such measures, namely the problem of an ever-present response bias, I discuss the question of whether subjective measures of consciousness are introspective. I show that there is no clear answer to this question, as proponents of subjective measures do not employ a worked-out notion of subjective access. In turn, this makes the problem of response bias less tractable than it might otherwise be.

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Maja Spener
University of Birmingham

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References found in this work

How can we construct a science of consciousness?David J. Chalmers - 2004 - In Michael S. Gazzaniga (ed.), The Cognitive Neurosciences Iii. MIT Press. pp. 1111--1119.
Implicit learning of artificial grammars.Arthur S. Reber - 1967 - Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior 6:855-863.
How to measure metacognition.Stephen M. Fleming & Hakwan C. Lau - 2014 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 8.
Priming with and without awareness.J. Cheesman & Philip M. Merikle - 1984 - Perception and Psychophysics 36:387-95.

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