Abstract

This dissertation explores the problem regarding the objectification of language and the split between thought and poetry. The problem is examined from both a philosophical and a psychoanalytical perspective. The split between thought and poetry is rather complex and it manifests itself in various contexts.

In _The Man without Content Giorgio_ Agamben (1999c) discusses this problem with reference to the sphere of the aesthetic. According to Agamben the birth of modern aesthetics and the problem of representation is the result of a primordial objectification of language. Agamben conveys the instance of the objectification of language as inseparable from a split between thought and poetry. Since modernity this division, which is at the origin of Western culture, has become increasingly manifest. It is, according to Agamben, the underlying cause of a series of schisms for example between artist and spectator, genius and taste, and form and matter which has, in our present time, reached its furthest point.

In _The Parallax View_ Slavoj Zizek discusses similar schisms that is currently discernible in various spheres. In the context of my research, it is his discussion of the split between objective knowledge and subjective truth that is of special interest. In my dissertation this division is respectively brought to bear on the split between thought and poetry. (This claim is broadly expanded on in chapter four). The split between objective knowledge and subjective truth manifests itself, in the social context, as the antinomy of essentialism and constructionism.

My discussion commences in _chapter one_ with an introductory overview of the theme under investigation.

In _chapter two_ the theme is first of all examined from a philosophical perspective. In this regard it is primarily the work of Giorgio Agamben, and especially his view of the nature of language that guides my discussion. According to Agamben we cannot regard language as something (an articulated unity) that has always already taken place. Language rather exists in the form of pure potentiality. By reinterpreting Aristotles doctrine of potentiality, Agamben comes to the conclusion that potentiality is, originally, an (im)potentiality. In so far as the human being is language, he _is_ this (im)potentiality and this (im)potentiality should be seen as the dimension of the _un_appropriable. In view of this _un_appropriability mans primordial situation cannot be a unity (at least not a reflexive or reflected unity). The human being, in so far as he _is_ language, _is_ the primordial gap that enables meaning and signification to _take place_. According to Agamben this (im)potentiality (the dimension of the _un_appropriable) has, however, undergone a primordial objectification in Aristotles logico-metaphysical structure of knowledge. Since then, language as the primordial gap that enables presence and meaning to _take place_, has been neglected or forgotten.

In _chapter three_ the primordial objectification of language and the split between thought and poetry is also considered from a psychoanalytical perspective. The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the reader to some of the main concepts in Jacques Lacans exposition of symbolic identification. Attention will only be given to those aspects in the Lacanian psychoanalysis that are related to the theme of research.

In _chapter four_ the psychoanalytic description of the problem is continued. The relation between thought and poetry is explained by reference to two fantasmatic structures of denial. In the Lacanian psychoanalysis the two fantasmatic structures of denial are descriptive of two distinctive modalities of reflection. They represent two subjective attitudes that in psychoanalytic terms are described as the subject of desire and the subject of drive. In this chapter the relation between these two fantasmatic structures and Agambens description of thought and poetry in our time is being explored.

In _chapter five_ the theme under investigation is brought to a preliminary conclusion. In this chapter the co-belonging of thought and poetry is being examined in view of Lacans later conception of language as _non_-All. Of special interest is Lacans concept of the traversing of the fundamental fantasy as well as his ideas regarding the end of the psychoanalytic process. In so far as language is not an articulated unity but rather _non_-All, the co-belonging of thought and poetry implies more than a mere reciprocity of opposites. I hope that we will eventually be able to conceive of a different, and more original kind of relation between the subject and his own inherent _un_appropriability. The denial of this dimension is currently the cause of an impasse in the process of symbolic identification. It points to mans egoistic illusion of authority and self-righteousness.

Lacans concept of the traversing of the fundamental fantasy implies a kind of conciliation between (or co-belonging of) the word (the sphere of the symbolic) and a certain excess or remainder (the_ un_appropriable) over which it has no control. The conciliation or appropriation as being used in this context should not be understood in the usual sense. The conciliation of the word with itself rather points to the subjects experience and acceptance of the dimension of _un_appropriability. This _un_appropriability derives from the negativity inherent in mans drives. In view of this _un_appropriability mans primordial situation is characterised by a feeling of fragmentation and disruption. It is this feeling of fragmentation and disruption which makes mans (or languages) reference to himself _im_possible.

The task of thought then is to traverse the subjects (languages) own presupposition; that is, his presupposed unity or fundamental fantasy. We have to accept the fact that our essence is not something that can be possessed or appropriated as such. Eventually we have to experience and appropriate the _un_appropriable as the inconceivable content and _limit_ inherent in every expression. The _un_appropriable is precisely that dimension in the sphere of the symbolic over which we have no control whatsoever. In view of this the concept of redemption also assumes a new meaning. In this moment the subject experiences his inherent _un_appropriability as constitutive of his freedom. He recognizes his freedom precisely in his primordial bondage (or lack of freedom) that he will never be able to get rid of. This experience should be brought to bear on Agambens description of the experience of language (the _factum loquendi_) as a dimension of (im)potentiality. The subjects experience and acceptance of a certain disruption (or the _un_appropriability of language) is the realisation of _un_reality here and now.

© University of Pretoria 2007