A Rule‐based Account of the Regulative Use of Reason in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason

European Journal of Philosophy 31 (3):673-688 (2023)
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Abstract

The aim of this paper is to propose a novel reading of the critical legitimacy of the regulative use of reason in the Transcendental Dialectic of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. After introducing some key terminology of the Dialectic, I analyse the shortcomings of two influential accounts of the regulative use of reason and identify their common problem in their commitment to the descriptivity of the ideas of reason. I then offer my rule‐based account of the regulative use of reason by clarifying how Kant transforms reason's metaphysical inclinations into prescriptive rules of bottom‐up empirical research. Finally, I explain why such interpretation of reason is metaphysically innocent and thereby a promising approach to understand its role in Kant's scientific project.

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Lorenzo Spagnesi
Universität Trier

Citations of this work

Regulative Idealization: A Kantian Approach to Idealized Models.Lorenzo Spagnesi - 2023 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 99 (C):1-9.

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