Two Objections to the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness

Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (9-10):186-201 (2020)
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Abstract

This article discusses two arguments against the integrated information theory (IIT) of consciousness. The first argument says that IIT is wrong in saying that conscious experiences are identical to conceptual structures; they are very different in many ways. The second argument says that the seeming presence of non-conscious integrated information either makes IIT falsified or unfalsifiable. The first argument seeks to show that integrated information is not identical to consciousness; the second argument seeks to show that integrated information is not even always correlated with consciousness.

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