Uma teoria naturalista da justificação das crenças na epistemologia de David Hume

Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 18 (2):227 (2014)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

One of the first difficulties in interpreting Hume’s epistemological writings concerns precisely the meaning of the words ‘knowledge’ and ‘belief’. In this article it is shown, initially, how, from a humean point of view, the traditional epistemic criterion to define ‘knowledge’ and ‘belief’ appears very restrictive. Hume’s theory of causal belief is then briefly reviewed in the light of epistemological naturalism of the Michael J. Costa and Louis E. Loeb. Finally, it is submitted that the examination of all these topics lends support to the Hume’s naturalistic theory of justification of beliefs.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,616

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Notas sobre a idéia de 'justificação pública'.Cláudio Reis - 2000 - Philósophos - Revista de Filosofia 5 (1):21-38.
¿Ha sido derrotada la teoría clásica del Derecho natural por el argumento de la falacia naturalista?Carlos A. Casanova - 2014 - Logos. Anales Del Seminario de Metafísica [Universidad Complutense de Madrid, España] 47:37-54.
Hume e a epistemologia.João Paulo Monteiro - 2009 - [Lisbon, Portugal]: Impr. Nacional-Casa da Moeda.

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-06-13

Downloads
30 (#459,535)

6 months
1 (#1,042,085)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Theory of knowledge.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1966 - Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,: Prentice-Hall.
A Treatise of Human Nature.David Hume & A. D. Lindsay - 1958 - Philosophical Quarterly 8 (33):379-380.
Skepticism and Naturalism: Some Varieties.Peter Strawson - 1985 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Hume.Barry Stroud - 2016 - Philosophical Review 125 (4):597-601.

View all 21 references / Add more references