On Ur-intentionality

Revista de Filosofia Moderna E Contemporânea 9 (2):79-99 (2021)
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Starting from Brentano’s classical characterization of intentionality, we review the radical enactivist proposal about basic cognition and show that the underlying assumption that stripping teleosemantics of its representationalist commitments results in no explanatory loss is unwarranted. Significant features of basic cognition are lost, or so we argue, with the RECtification of teleosemantics that are retrieved by means of an alternative dubbed metaphysically non-committal content-ascriptivism.



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Author Profiles

Carlos Mario Márquez Sosa
University of São Paulo
Ludovic Soutif
Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio de Janeiro

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References found in this work

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans & John Mcdowell - 1986 - Philosophy 61 (238):534-538.
Misrepresenting & Malfunctioning.Karen Neander - 1995 - Philosophical Studies 79 (2):109-141.
The intentionality all-stars.John Haugeland - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:383-427.

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