Abstract

In 1929 and 1930 Wittgenstein holds some form of Phenomenology. This is a most surprising development of his thought. His Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, published in 1921, represents a form of Philosophy radically opposed to Phenomenology. And yet, "Some Remarks on Logical Form," of 1929, and Philosophical Remarks, of 1930, each defends a form of Phenomenology, in the sense that in each one finds that Wittgenstein presents a version of the thesis that the phenomena of immediate experience are in some way central to construal of meaningfulness. I study this period of Wittgenstein's Philosophy with the objective of clarifying his concern with the study of the phenomena. It will emerge that he holds not one, but rather two different forms of Phenomenology. "Some Remarks on Logical Form" gives voice to one conception of the phenomena and of their role in the determination of the rules which stipulate meaningfulness. Philosophical Remarks, on the other hand, contains a criticism of this view, as well as a different conception of the phenomena and of their role with respect to the rules of meaningfulness . It also emerges that the former kind of Phenomenology is very similar to the Phenomenology of Edmund Husserl, the founder of Phenomenology. I will examine Wittgenstein's Phenomenology of 1929, its similarity with the Phenomenology of Edmund Husserl, his rejection of this conception, and his Phenomenology of 1930