The Veil of Ignorance and Health Resource Allocation

Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 37 (4):387-404 (2012)
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Abstract

Some authors view the veil of ignorance as a preferred method for allocating resources because it imposes impartiality by stripping deliberators of knowledge of their personal identity. Using some prominent examples of such reasoning in the health care sector, I will argue for the following claims. First, choice behind a veil of ignorance often fails to provide clear guidance regarding resource allocation. Second, regardless of whether definite results could be derived from the veil, these results do not in themselves have important moral standing. This is partly because the veil does not determine which features are morally relevant for a given distributive problem. Third, even when we have settled the question of what features to count, choice behind a veil of ignorance arguably fails to take persons seriously. Ultimately, we do not need the veil to solve distributive problems, and we have good reason to appeal to some other distributive model

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2012-07-26

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References found in this work

Selecting people randomly.John Broome - 1984 - Ethics 95 (1):38-55.
Impartiality and disability discrimination.Greg Bognar - 2011 - Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 21 (1):1-23.
Would Aristotle have played Russian roulette?J. Harris - 1996 - Journal of Medical Ethics 22 (4):209-215.

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