Davidson's thinking causes

In John Heil & Alfred R. Mele (eds.), Mental Causation. Oxford University Press (1993)
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Ernest Sosa
Rutgers University - New Brunswick

Citations of this work

Replication without replicators.Bence Nanay - 2011 - Synthese 179 (3):455-477.
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