Originless Sin: Rational Dilemmas for Satisficers

Philosophical Quarterly 56 (223):213 - 223 (2006)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Suppose you have an infinite past. If you had banked the spare dollar you have always had, then the interest would have made you rich by now. Your procrastination is inexcusable. But what should you have done? At any time at which you invest the dollar you would regret not investing it earlier. Satisficers can solve prospective puzzles involving infinite choice but cannot solve this retrospective puzzle about regret. A moral version of the puzzle suggests that there can be inevitable moral failure. It does so without appeal to moral luck, moral dilemmas or original sin

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,386

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Moral Dilemmas and Moral Luck.M. V. Dougherty - 2004 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 78:233-246.
Moral Dilemmas and Inevitable Sin.R. Dennis Potter - 2003 - Faith and Philosophy 20 (1):63-71.
Dilemmas and Moral Realism.Nick Zangwill - 1999 - Utilitas 11 (1):71.
The definition of moral dilemmas: A logical problem. [REVIEW]Jurriaan De Haan - 2001 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 4 (3):267-284.
Moral dilemmas and comparative conceptions of morality.Peter Vallentyne - 1992 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 30 (1):117-124.
“Two Types of Moral Dilemmas”.Peter Vallentyne - 1989 - Erkenntnis 30 (3):301-318.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
84 (#196,609)

6 months
7 (#411,886)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Roy Sorensen
University of Texas at Austin

Citations of this work

Satisficing and Motivated Submaximization (in the Philosophy of Religion).Chris Tucker - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (1):127-143.
Can God Satisfice?Klass Kraay - 2013 - American Philosophical Quarterly 50 (4):399-410.
Two paradoxes of bounded rationality.David Thorstad - 2022 - Philosophers' Imprint 22.

View all 8 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Rational dilemmas.G. Priest - 2002 - Analysis 62 (1):11-16.
Satisficing and optimality.Michael Byron - 1998 - Ethics 109 (1):67-93.
Utilitarian Eschatology.Mark T. Nelson - 1991 - American Philosophical Quarterly 28 (4):339-47.
Satisficing and Virtue.Christine Swanton - 1993 - Journal of Philosophy 90 (1):33-48.

View all 9 references / Add more references