Fugu for Logicians

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (1):131-144 (2014)
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Abstract

What do you get when you cross a fallacy with a good argument? A fugu, that is, a valid argument that tempts you to reach its conclusion invalidly. You have yielded to the temptation more than you realize. If you are a teacher, you may have served many fugus. They arise systematically through several mechanisms. Fugus are interesting intermediate cases that shed light on the following issues: bare evidentialism, false pleasure, philosophy of education, and the ethics of argument. Normally, a fugu will not yield knowledge from known premises. But if the reasoning is only slightly fallacious, they do yield knowledge. These mild fugus show that we can gain knowledge by invalid reasoning. This is a conservative resource for historians. They want to credit discoveries to Euclid rather than those who made minor corrections to his proofs, such as David Hilbert. We also benefit from this practice of grandfathering in old standards of knowledge attribution. For we can compete spiritedly for priority. We do not need to worry that credit will instead go to future scholars who will make the minor amendments needed to raise present proofs to a future standard of demonstration

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Roy Sorensen
University of Texas at Austin

Citations of this work

Generalized Update Semantics.Simon Goldstein - 2019 - Mind 128 (511):795-835.
Close to the Truth.Peter Baumann - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (5):1769-1775.
Knowledge, justification, and adequate reasons.Paul Égré, Paul Marty & Bryan Renne - 2021 - Review of Symbolic Logic 14 (3):687-727.

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References found in this work

Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?Edmund Gettier - 1963 - Analysis 23 (6):121-123.
On liberty.John Stuart Mill - 2000 - In Steven M. Cahn (ed.), Exploring Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 519-522.
The Role of the Priority Rule in Science.Michael Strevens - 2003 - Journal of Philosophy 100 (2):55-79.

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