Charity Implies Meta‐Charity

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2):290-315 (2004)
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Abstract

The principle of charity says that all agents are rational. The principle of meta‐charity says that all agents believe all agents are rational. My thesis is that the arguments which are used to support charity also support meta‐charity. Meta‐charity implies meta‐meta‐charity. By recursion, the principle of charity implies that it is common knowledge. But there appears to be intelligent, well‐informed disagreement with the principle of charity. So if the entailment thesis holds, opponents of the principle of charity have a new objection to the principle. Defenders of the principle of charity must either refute the entailment thesis or accept much stronger consequences than they expected.“As I am, so I see.”—Ralph Waldo Emerson.

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Roy Sorensen
University of Texas at Austin

Citations of this work

Breaking Out of the Circle.Caravello John - 2018 - Argumentation 32 (1):25-35.
Spurning charity.Paul Saka - 2007 - Axiomathes 17 (2):197-208.

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References found in this work

Epistemology and cognition.Alvin I. Goldman - 1986 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Knowledge and belief.Jaakko Hintikka - 1962 - Ithaca, N.Y.,: Cornell University Press.
Philosophical papers.David Kellogg Lewis - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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