Norms of Epistemic Diversity

Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology 3 (1):23-36 (2006)
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Abstract

Epistemic diversity is widely approved of by social epistemologists. This paper asks, more specifically, how much epistemic diversity, and what kinds of epistemic diversity are normatively appropriate? Bothlaissez-faireand highly directive approaches to epistemic diversity are rejected in favor of the claim that diversity is a blunt epistemic tool. There are typically a number of different options for adequate diversification. The paper focuses on scientific domains, with particular attention to recent theories of smell.

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