Modus Ponens and Modus Tollens for Conditional Probabilities, and Updating on Uncertain Evidence

Theory and Decision 66 (2):103 - 148 (2009)
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Abstract

There are narrowest bounds for P(h) when P(e) = y and P(h/e) = x, which bounds collapse to x as y goes to 1. A theorem for these bounds -- bounds for probable modus ponens -- entails a principle for updating on possibly uncertain evidence subject to these bounds that is a generalization of the principle for updating by conditioning on certain evidence. This way of updating on possibly uncertain evidence is appropriate when updating by ’probability kinematics’ or ’Jeffrey-conditioning’ is, and apparently in countless other cases as well. A more complicated theorem due to Karl Wagner -- bounds for probable modus tollens -- registers narrowest bounds for P(not h) when P(not e) = y and P(e/h) = x. This theorem serves another principle for updating on possibly uncertain evidence that might be termed ’contraditioning’, though it is for a way of updating that seems in practice to be frequently not appropriate. It is definitely not a way of putting down a theory -- for example, a random-chanc

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References found in this work

The Logic of Decision.Richard C. Jeffrey - 1965 - New York, NY, USA: University of Chicago Press.
Subjective Probability: The Real Thing.Richard C. Jeffrey - 2002 - Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
Logic and Theism: Arguments for and Against Beliefs in God.Jordan Howard Sobel - 2003 - New York: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Jordan Howard Sobel.
Is there a dutch book argument for probability kinematics?Brad Armendt - 1980 - Philosophy of Science 47 (4):583-588.

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