From Valuing to Value: A Defense of Subjectivism

Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press (2016)
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Abstract

David Sobel defends subjectivism about well-being and reasons for action: the idea that normativity flows from what an agent cares about, that something is valuable because it is valued. In these essays Sobel explores the tensions between subjective views of reasons and morality, and concludes that they do not undermine subjectivism.

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David Sobel
Syracuse University

Citations of this work

Well-being.Roger Crisp - 2013 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Do We Have Normative Powers?Ruth Chang - 2020 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 94 (1):275-300.
Who’s on first.Daniel Wodak - 2020 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 15.

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