Confirmation and law-likeness

Philosophical Review 97 (1):93-98 (1988)
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Abstract

Nelson Goodman suggests that a generalization of the form “all A’s are B” is confirmable by an observed instance only if the generalization is law-like. Jackson and Pargetter deny this and give examples of how accidental generalizations can be confirmed. A possible response from Goodman appears to make these accidental generalizations look law-like, but I show it’s defective. And Jackson and Pargetter's substitute nomological condition fares no better than Goodman’s. Because of the multiplicity of possible background assumptions, I doubt that there is a single “nomological condition” that each and every act of confirmation must obey.

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Elliott Sober
University of Wisconsin, Madison

Citations of this work

The multiple realizability argument against reductionism.Elliott Sober - 1999 - Philosophy of Science 66 (4):542-564.
Inference to the Best explanation.Peter Lipton - 2004 - In Martin Curd & Stathis Psillos (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science. Routledge. pp. 193.
Induction and inference to the best explanation.Ruth Weintraub - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (1):203-216.
Independent evidence about a common cause.Elliott Sober - 1989 - Philosophy of Science 56 (2):275-287.

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