Abstract

Roscelin of Compiegne usually is regarded as the founder of nominalism. I show that Roscelin did not originate this position on the question of universals, but instead is an early Mediaeval representative of a tradition of anti-realism which has its roots in the Early Stoa, and perhaps earlier in the Sophists. ;In the first chapter I trace the origins of anti-realism to the relativistic humanism and empiricism of the Sophists. I lay out Plato's early theory of Forms as a response to the Sophists, and then I examine Aristotle's criticisms of the Forms from the Topics and the Categories. I then introduce the Stoics' rejection of the Forms as the origin of what in the Middle Ages became anti-realism. ;Chapters II through IV trace the development of the question of universals as a distinct philosophical problem, and anti-realism as an answer, in the context of Platonic, Aristotelian, Stoic, and Roman Grammatical traditions. I examine the works of major figures, from Porphyry to Berengar of Tours, to show the development of the various answers to the question of universals. ;In Chapter V, I take a close look at the only book devoted to Roscelin's life and thought, Roscelin Philosophe et Theologien, written in 1911 by Francois Picavet. I show that there was a tradition of dialectical anti-realism of which Roscelin was but one early twelfth century representative. ;By showing that Roscelin was not the originator of anti-realism, I am suggesting that an examination of the early Mediaeval debate on universals in light of its descent from much earlier traditions demonstrates the philosophical richness of the early Middle Ages and is greater than is commonly supposed