Contrastive Reasons

New York, NY: Oxford University Press (2017)
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Abstract

Justin Snedegar develops and defends contrastivism about reasons. This is the view that normative reasons are fundamentally reasons for or against actions or attitudes only relative to sets of alternatives. Simply put, reasons are always reasons to do one thing rather than another, instead of simply being reasons to do something, full stop.

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Justin Snedegar
University of Virginia

Citations of this work

Consequentialism.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Supererogation and Conditional Obligation.Daniel Muñoz & Theron Pummer - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (5):1429–1443.
Suspension, Higher-Order Evidence, and Defeat.Errol Lord & Kurt Sylvan - 2021 - In Jessica Brown & Mona Simion, Reasons, Justification, and Defeat. Oxford Oxford: Oxford University Press.
What makes reasons sufficient?Mark Schroeder - 2015 - American Philosophical Quarterly 52 (2):159-170.

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