Contrastive Reasons

New York, NY: Oxford University Press (2017)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Justin Snedegar develops and defends contrastivism about reasons. This is the view that normative reasons are fundamentally reasons for or against actions or attitudes only relative to sets of alternatives. Simply put, reasons are always reasons to do one thing rather than another, instead of simply being reasons to do something, full stop.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 84,361

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Negative Reason Existentials.Justin Snedegar - 2013 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):108-116.
Reason claims and contrastivism about reasons.Justin Snedegar - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (2):231-242.
Contrastivism About Reasons and Ought.Justin Snedegar - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (6):379-388.
Ethics and Contrastivism.Justin Snedegar - 2014 - Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Friendship and Reasons of Intimacy.Diane Jeske - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):329-346.
Argumentation and the Force of Reasons.Robert C. Pinto - 2009 - Informal Logic 29 (3):268-295.
Epistemic Reasons I: Normativity.Kurt Sylvan - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (7):364-376.
Reasons for action: Justification vs. explanation.James Lenman - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Friendship and reasons of intimacy.Diane Jeske - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):329-346.
Reasons, Values, and Rational Actions.Paul K. Moser - 1990 - Journal of Philosophical Research 15:127-151.
Facts, Ends, and Normative Reasons.Hallvard Lillehammer - 2010 - The Journal of Ethics 14 (1):17-26.
Value and reasons to favour.Jonathan Way - 2013 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 8.

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-04-18

Downloads
37 (#342,373)

6 months
3 (#249,054)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Justin Snedegar
University of St. Andrews

Citations of this work

Consequentialism.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Supererogation and Conditional Obligation.Daniel Muñoz & Theron Pummer - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (5):1429–1443.
Suspension, Higher-Order Evidence, and Defeat.Errol Lord & Kurt Sylvan - forthcoming - In Mona Simion & Jessica Brown (eds.), Reasons, Justification, and Defeat. Oxford University Press.

View all 23 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references