The argument from motivation

Mind 84 (333):1-9 (1975)
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Abstract

Much of the plausibility of non-cognitivism in meta-ethics rests on the following argument derived from hume: 1) cognitive judgments alone can never have any motivational influence on our actions, 2) moral judgments have a motivational influence on our actions, and 3) therefore, no moral judgment is simply a cognitive judgment. this paper subjects various forms of this argument to criticism

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Citations of this work

Hume's emotivist theory of moral judgements.James Chamberlain - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 28 (4):1058-1072.
Expressivism and the practicality of moral convictions.Neil Sinclair - 2007 - Journal of Value Inquiry 41 (2-4):201-220.
Propositional clothing and belief.Neil Sinclair - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 57 (228):342-362.
Internalizm i eksternalizm w metaetyce.Tomasz Żuradzki - 2012 - Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego.
Hume on Justice.Rosalind Hursthouse - 2009 - In Charles R. Pigden (ed.), Hume on Motivation and Virtue. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 264.

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