Kagan on Speciesism and Modal Personism

Journal of Applied Philosophy 36 (1):73-92 (2017)
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Shelly Kagan argues in his ‘What's Wrong with Speciesism?’ for four provocative claims: 1. speciesism is not necessarily a mere prejudice; 2. most people are not speciesists; 3. ‘modal personism’ more closely reflects what most people believe, and 4. modal personism might be true. In this article, I object to Kagan's account of what constitutes a ‘mere prejudice’, and I object to the sort of argument he uses to show that most people are not speciesist. I then attempt to motivate, and defend what I take to be the best version of modal personism; answer several problems for the view; and raise other problems that I think are harder to answer.



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Doran Smolkin
Kwantlen Polytechnic University

Citations of this work

What’s Wrong with Speciesism.François Jaquet - 2022 - Journal of Value Inquiry 56 (3):395-408.
All Animals are Equal, but Some More than Others?Huub Brouwer & Willem van der Deijl - 2020 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 17 (3):342-357.

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